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SOMEWHERE TO RUN, SOMEWHERE TO
HIDE?: INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
HUMAN SUBJECT EXPERIMENTATION
ADAM H. LAUGHTON*
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most important players
in the field of clinical research on human beings. Increasingly in
recent years, “Big Pharma” in the United States and elsewhere has
turned to foreign populations to test its new products. The purpose
of this note is to examine how existing sources of quasi-legal and
ethical regulation address the troublesome issues raised by this
increase in international human experimentation. First, the note
gives a brief history of human experimentation and its regulation,
giving special focus to the events of the twentieth century that have
most affected the development of the bioethics movement. Next, it
describes and compares several instruments of international
regulation of human subject experimentation. Finally, it examines
some of the difficult ethical issues associated with international
research on human subjects. In this discussion, the greatest amount
of attention will be given to clinical trials performed by the
pharmaceutical industry. Other types of international research on
human subjects exist, but research by the pharmaceutical companies
poses its own special regulatory and ethical problems.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Nuremberg
Though the Holocaust and the concurrent Nazi experimentation
1
on prisoners and Jews brought unprecedented attention to
Copyright © 2007 by Adam H. Laughton.
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1. See infra Part I.B.
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experiments on human subjects, such experimentation and ethical
reflection thereon began much earlier. One of the earliest codes of
2
medical ethics was the Hippocratic Oath. The Hippocratic Oath’s
focus is on care that directly benefits the patient; however, as in many
early documents regarding ethics and human experimentation, that
benefit is determined by the doctor and not the patient.3 While the
oath does not directly address human research,4 the issue of
delegating decision-making to physicians arises in later international
codes and agreements on human experimentation.
Perhaps as a result of the lack of attention to human subject
research, experimentation continued unabated and largely
5
unregulated until the 19th century. In 1803, Thomas Percival, an
English physician, promulgated a code of medical ethics that dealt
directly with human experimentation.6 Like the Hippocratic Oath,
Percival’s code is decidedly skewed towards the interests of
physicians and experts. There is no mention of consent or other
protections of human subjects.7 The first American code of ethics
dealing with human experimentation was created by William
8
Beaumont in 1833. The most important aspect of Beaumont’s code,
in comparison with that of Percival, is that it recognizes the necessity
of the subject’s voluntary consent and requires that experimentation
cease if, at any time, the subject is “distress[ed]” or “dissatisfied.”9 In
1865, the French physiologist Claude Bernard published his own
guidelines governing human experimentation, which precluded any
human experimentation that would not be of direct benefit to the
patient, no matter its value to science.10 However, the valuation of
that benefit remained in the discretion of the physician.
Ironically, one of the first official regulations of human
experimentation came out of the Prussian government in 1900,11

2. See Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121,
123 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992).
3. Id. at 123-25.
4. Id. at 123.
5. See id. at 124 (giving examples of human research involving experimental vaccinations
of children and prisoners).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 125.
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 125-26.
11. Id. at 127.
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which was then part of the German Empire.12 The Prussian directive
expressly prohibited non-therapeutic research either on incompetent
individuals (including children) or where the subject had not given
“unequivocal[]” consent to the procedure after having it explained to
13
him. Historical records and contemporary press reports show that
these guidelines were largely ignored by German medical researchers
throughout the decades between their promulgation and 1931—when
14
new guidelines were introduced.
These new guidelines were
generated by the Reich Health Council and published by the Reich
Minister of the Interior in response to reports of lax ethical standards
15
among German medical researchers.
The new standards were
among the most comprehensive and protective of the patients’
interests, as compared with other codes of ethics then extant.16
Experimentation on dying persons was strictly prohibited and
17
research on minors was circumscribed. The Reich Circular required
that human research be carried out only after laboratory testing and
18
animal studies were completed. Furthermore, it required informed
consent of patients and introduced more extensive protections for
“scientific experimentation” (non-therapeutic research) than for
“innovative therapy” (therapeutic research).19
These German
regulations are particularly relevant because they were the standards
that existed at the time of the Nazi experiments, and against which
the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg themselves wished to be judged.20
B. The Nuremberg Doctors Trial
The precipitating crisis of the modern bioethics movement was
the extensive and cruel human experimentation performed on

12. See Historical Atlas of Europe, Complete Map of Europe, Year 1900,
http://www.euratlas.com/history_europe/europe_map_1900.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008).
13. Grodin, supra note 2, at 127.
14. Id. at 128-29 (detailing the following problems: “placing the lives of small children on
the same level as those of . . . rats[,] . . . mental and physical torture[,] . . . disgustingly shameful
abominations in the name of science run mad[, and] . . . discrimination between the rich and the
poor”).
15. Id. at 129.
16. Id. at 129, 131-32.
17. Reichsgesundheitsblatt 11, No. 10, 174-75 (Mar. 1931), reprinted in 31 INT’L DIG. OF
HEALTH LEGIS. 408, 408-11 (1980).
18. Id. Interestingly, a 1933 law by the Nazis effectively prohibited experimentation on
animals but left the guidelines otherwise intact. Grodin, supra note 2, at 132.
19. See Reichsgesundheitsblatt, supra note 17.
20. Grodin, supra note 2, at 126.
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prisoners of the Nazi regime and the subsequent trial of twenty-three
Nazi doctors at Nuremberg, Germany beginning in December 1945.
During the Nazi regime, the practice of medicine was perverted from
its typical purposes of healing and aiding the sick and suffering and
was used instead to promote “ideas and solutions to the racial
problems” that the Nazis perceived were a plague on their country.21
This shift could represent a compelling explanation of why German
medical science moved away from the high ethical and professional
standards that it had previously set22 and toward the realm of pseudoscience and torture. The Nazi doctors performed a wide variety of
human experiments on prisoners (particularly Jews and gypsies)
during the course of the regime, including extended immersion in
cold water, extreme exposure to high-altitude conditions, exposure to
military biochemical agents, and sterilization.23
Often, these
experiments resulted in death (as they were designed to do).24
At the conclusion of the Nuremberg trial, fifteen of the twentythree doctor defendants were found guilty, including Karl Brandt,
who had been Hitler’s personal physician and Reich Commissioner
for Health and Sanitation, one of the highest-ranking positions in the
25
Nazi medical system. Seven of these fifteen were sentenced to death
by hanging and the rest were sentenced to prison terms of various
26
lengths. Alongside the final criminal judgment of the defendants,
the Nuremberg judges enumerated ten principles regarding
acceptable human experimentation.27 The proximate origin of these
principles was the contributions of two key experts for the
prosecution, Dr. Leo Alexander and Dr. Andrew Ivy, who drew on
historical sources such as the Hippocratic Oath.28 Dr. Ivy testified at
trial and Dr. Alexander had drawn up a memorandum for the judges,
each focusing on ethical principles related to human
experimentation.29 Today, the Nuremberg Code is probably “the

21. Joel Levi, Medicine, the Holocaust, and the Doctors’ Trial, in BIOETHICAL AND
ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE TRIALS AND CODE OF NUREMBERG: NUREMBERG
REVISITED 111, 114 (Jacques J. Rozenberg ed., 2003).
22. See supra Part I.A.
23. HORST H. FREYHOFER, THE NUREMBERG MEDICAL TRIAL: THE HOLOCAUST AND
THE ORIGIN OF THE NURSEMBERG MEDICAL CODE 26-37 (Peter Lang ed., 2004).
24. Id.
25. Levi, supra note 21, at 116, 124.
26. Id at 124.
27. Grodin, supra note 2, at 121.
28. Id. at 134.
29. Id.
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most accepted” and “the most cited” medical code of ethics.30 More
will be said about the content of the Nuremberg Code in Part II.A of
this Note.
C. Other Human Experiments Outside of Germany in the
Twentieth Century
It is important to remember that during World War II, and even
after, unethical human experiments were not being carried out solely
by the Nazis. Other countries, including Japan and the United States,
carried out similarly brutal and unethical experimentation. The
Japanese used U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in their biological
warfare experiments in China.31
Other weapons, such as
flamethrowers and grenades, were tested on human subjects,
including Allied POWs and Chinese living in the areas surrounding
concentration camps.32 Finally, a horrifying array of live human
vivisections, amputations, and experiments involving exposure to
various extreme conditions (pressure, centrifugal force, deprivation,
hunger and thirst) were performed by the Japanese on human
subjects.33 Despite the gruesome nature of their crimes, often similar
to those for which the Nazi doctors were punished, many Japanese
doctors were offered immunity from prosecution by the United States
in exchange for disclosing the results of their experiments.34
Perhaps most troubling from the American point of view is the
behavior of American scientists after the war with regard to human
experimentation. One example was a series of human radiation
experiments carried out with the support of various bodies of the
federal government throughout the first thirty years of the Cold War
(roughly 1940s-1970s).35 Over seven hundred American patients,
including terminally ill hospital patients, were used as part of thirty-

30. Levi, supra note 21, at 116.
31. George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics versus Expediency, in
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 2, at 201, 202.
32. See Christopher Hudson, Doctors of Depravity, THE DAILY MAIL (UK), Mar. 2, 2007,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=439776.
33. See id; Shane Green, The Asian Auschwitz of Unit 731, THE AGE, Aug. 29, 2002,
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/28/1030508070534.html.
34. Annas, supra note 31, at 202; see also Hudson, supra note 32.
35. George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal, and Self-Deception in
Postmodern Medical Research, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 312, 316 (Jonathan M. Mann
et al. eds., 1999).
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one experiments.36 Later reports indicated that the patients were
given no information about the purpose of the experiments, and
37
consent was not part of the research protocol. In one dramatic
example, a man had plutonium injected into his leg, which was then
amputated for study. The man was subsequently unable to work or
support himself.38 A federal judge, in a lawsuit by the families of the
subjects (most now dead), stated that the patients had allegedly been
39
treated “as though they were laboratory animals.”
Another infamous example of American human experimentation
during the Cold War concerns the Central Intelligence Agency’s
40
MKULTRA experiments. In its MKULTRA research and related
experiments, the CIA was interested in the effects of drugs, hypnosis,
41
and radiation for purposes of mind control and interrogation. One
of the arms of the MKULTRA experiments involved administering
LSD to “volunteers” who were unaware of the nature of the
experiment to which they would be subjected; other truly nonvolunteer subjects were randomly slipped LSD in bars in New York
City and San Francisco.42 These experiments resulted in the
43
accidental death of at least one subject.
Easily the most well-known of any human experiment carried on
by the United States is the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. Beginning in
1932, the United States Public Health Service initiated an experiment
with 600 black males in Tuskegee, Alabama, the purpose of which
44
was to study the natural history and progression of syphilis. When
the study began, over half the men were already infected with the
disease.45 In exchange for their participation in the study, the subjects

36. Id. at 316-17.
37. Id. at 317.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 319. This much was admitted by researchers, who claimed that “[o]f the common
laboratory animals, man appears to correspond most closely to the rat in regard to intravenous
tolerance to uranium.” Id. at 317.
40. MKULTRA is the most well-known of a series of CIA experiments that carry similar
designations. All of these involved testing the use of drugs or biochemical compounds on nonvolunteers. ANDREW GOLISZEK, IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF SECRET
PROGRAMS, MEDICAL RESEARCH, AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 151, 153-55 (2003).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 158, 160.
43. Id. at 159-60.
For detailed information about the history of CIA human
experimentation, see id. ch. 5.
44. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., The
Tuskegee Timeline, http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/tuskegee/time.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2008).
45. Id.
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received free food and medical care.46 However, the true nature of
the experiment was never explained to any of the subjects, and even
when an effective treatment to cure syphilis was discovered, it was not
offered to any of the study subjects.47
The Tuskegee study went on for an amazing forty years before it
was discovered and revealed by the press.48 The increased scrutiny
and criticism of the study by the press and government advisory
49
panels led to its immediate termination. Some compensation was
provided to the victims of the study in 1973, but it was not until 1997
that President Bill Clinton apologized for the injustice that had been
done to the experiment’s subjects.50 The revelation of the Tuskegee
experiments resulted in the passage of the National Research Act in
51
1974, which created the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.52 In 1979,
the Commission published the Belmont Report which identified
“basic ethical principles” and applications of those principles that
were relevant to human subject research.53 The recommendations of
the Belmont Report were adopted by the Department of Health and
Human Services and many other federal agencies and incorporated
into their regulations.54 These recommendations evolved into what is
currently known as the “Common Rule” for human research
55
protection.
D. The AZT 076 Clinical Trials in Africa
The next crisis in the history of international human subject
research revolved around the most significant global health crisis of
the late 20th century—HIV/AIDS. In 1997, several of the specific

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. National Research Services Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342; Ctrs. for Disease
Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., U.S. Public Health Service
Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
52. Office of Human Subjects Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, The Belmont Report:
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Apr. 18,
1979, http://www.nihtraining.com/ohsrsite/guidelines/belmont.html.
53. Id.
54. See Office for Human Research Protections, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
Belmont Report, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/belmontArchive.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
55. Id; see 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2006).
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ethical issues surrounding international drug trials became part of a
passionate dispute about AIDS-related research. The National
Institutes of Health had funded a trial of a new protocol of AZT, an
important retroviral drug used in AIDS therapy, in several African,
56
Asian, and Caribbean countries. An earlier test of AZT Protocol
076 had demonstrated a two-thirds reduction in mother-to-child HIV
transmission.57 Because of the high cost of AZT and that fact that
Protocol 076 was an intensive treatment regimen, the prospects for
providing the drug to HIV patients in impoverished countries were
bleak.58 Therefore, the new protocol involved a shortened regimen of
59
The trial researchers
AZT which was tested against a placebo.
claimed that they were looking for a more cost-effective, and
therefore more accessible, manner of providing treatment.60
Several researchers argued that use of a placebo in these trials,
given that a proven therapy was known, was unethical.61 The placebo
arm of the trial, under the circumstances, would have been legally
62
barred in the United States. The trial’s supporters were charged
with applying a double standard and exploiting trial participants
63
because of lower standards abroad. Opponents also claimed that
even the shortened AZT regimen would have been too expensive in
certain trial sites where the average annual health expenditure was
only about ten dollars.64 Trial supporters fired back, claiming that the
use of a placebo-controlled trial was essential in rendering a faster,
more useful and scientifically reliable answer about the efficacy of the
shortened regimen, and would, in the end, benefit the countries in
which the trials were being performed.65 Trial researchers responded
to charges of exploitation with claims that their opponents were
“ethical imperialists,” seeking to impose Western standards that
56. AURORA PLOMER, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL
BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 114 (2005).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 115. The cost per patient at the time was approximately $800. Id.
59. Id. at 114.
60. See id. at 115.
61. Peter Lurie & Sid M. Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to Reduce Perinatal
Transmission of the Human Immunodefeciency Virus in Developing Countries, 337 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 853, 853 (1997). It is also important to note that in the earlier test of Protocol 076, once
the dramatic efficacy of the treatment was discovered, the placebo arm of the test was shut
down immediately. Id.
62. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 114.
63. Lurie & Wolfe, supra note 61, at 855.
64. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 115.
65. Id.
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would prevent the needs of developing world populations from being
66
met.
In the end, the short regimen of AZT had rates of success similar
67
to Protocol 076. Future clinical trials would compare the results of
this short-course AZT regimen against those of even less intensive
and costly regimens of competing retrovirals, such as nevirapine,
which proved to be even more effective in preventing mother-to-child
HIV transmission.68 This episode illustrates several of the enduring
and relevant debates surrounding pharmaceutical trials overseas.
E. The Contemporary Background of International Clinical Trials
The pharmaceutical industry has legitimately earned its common
moniker “Big Pharma.” It has been the most consistently profitable
69
In 2005, global pharmaceutical
industry since World War II.
spending exceeded $600 billion.70 This represents a growth rate of
seven percent worldwide, but emerging markets in Asia, Europe and
71
However, the development
Latin America grew even faster.
pipeline for new pharmaceutical products is a lengthy and costly one.
The typical drug costs about $802 million over the course of its
research and development, which lasts ten to fifteen years.72
The most difficult hurdle for new drugs to overcome is Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval, the sine qua non of drug
marketability in the United States. The FDA approval process, which
is overseen by the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
73
74
(CDER), consists of a series of four phases of clinical trials. These

66. Id. at 116.
67. SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS 97 (2006).
68. Id. at 98.
69. Annas, supra note 35, at 324.
70. Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reps. Global Pharm. Mkt. Grew 7 Percent in
2005, to $602 Billion (Mar. 21, 2006), available at http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/
articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_77491316,00.html.
71. Id.
72. PHRMA, PHARM. INDUS. PROFILE 2007, at 5-6, available at http://www.phrma.org/
files/Profile%202007.pdf.
73. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/faq/default.htm [hereinafter CDER FAQ]
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
74. Barr
Pharmaceuticals,
Proprietary
Product
FDA
Approval
Process,
http://www.barrlabs.com/proprietary/approval.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); see also CTR. FOR
DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CDER HANDBOOK 19,
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/handbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
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trials test a new drug’s safety and efficacy. 75 The approval process
also involves institutional review by the FDA, and meetings between
76
the new drug’s sponsor and the CDER. Each of the first three
phases of a clinical trial require progressively more test subjects,
77
Because not all
peaking at around 3,000 for a Phase III trial.
patients who apply for a place in a clinical trial will be eligible, and
many eligible subjects may not show up for their scheduled check-ups
or follow the prescribed protocol, new drug sponsors may have to find
many more willing subjects than the number required for the trial to
get off the ground.78
A problem facing pharmaceutical companies who need a trial
with several thousand willing participants is that Americans are
increasingly hesitant to participate in these experiments.79 The lack of
clinical trial volunteers has caused a back-up in the “pipeline” of
developing drugs.80 Though both the cost and the number of new
drug trials have increased in the past few years, the annual output of
81
new FDA-approved drugs has remained steady. The immediate
effect of this trend has been to transfer the task of finding and
carrying out new trials from academic medical centers, which the
pharmaceutical industry saw as too slow to review and carry out the
trials, to contract research organizations (CROs).82 CROs are
independent contractors who perform the tests and compile and
83
submit the results to the FDA on behalf of the drug companies.
CROs are more aggressive and faster in finding patients and
carrying out the trials and were the main proponents of moving more

75. Barr Pharmaceuticals, supra note 74.
76. Id.
77. ClinicalTrials.gov, Understanding Clinical Trials,
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/
understand (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). Phase IV trials are post-marketing trials that test longterm effectiveness and safety. CenterWatch, Background Information on Clinical Research,
http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/backgrnd.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
78. SHAH, supra note 67, at 3.
79. See id. at 4-5 (noting that less than one in twenty Americans is willing to take part in
clinical trials and less than four percent of cancer patients would participate in a new cancer
drug trial). Until the ethical reforms of the 1970s outlawed it, the U.S. prison population
presented a “captive audience” of subjects for new drug trials. Id. at 6.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2007) (“Contract research organization means a person that
assumes, as an independent contractor with the sponsor, one or more of the obligations of a
sponsor, e.g., design of a protocol, selection or monitoring of investigations, evaluation of
reports, and preparation of materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration.”).
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clinical trials overseas.84 The role of CROs has plausibly led many
pharmaceutical companies, including some industry giants like
GlaxoSmithKline and Merck, to conduct between thirty and fifty
percent of their clinical trials overseas.85 The number of clinical
investigators overseas is growing too—up eight percent between 2001
and 2003, with a corresponding eleven percent decrease in the
number of U.S. researchers.86 New trials are generally moving toward
more impoverished countries with larger “sick” populations—
including Russia, India, and countries in Eastern Europe and Latin
America.87
The shift of clinical trials to sites abroad has important
implications for both countries hosting trials and those whose
companies are sponsoring the research. Overseas clinical trials may
be cheaper than domestic trials and may also enable new drugs to
reach the market faster, resulting in greater profits for the
pharmaceutical companies. The rapid approval and introduction of
new drugs will likely result in increased health (or increased sickness
if the testing is carried out poorly) for the populations to whom the
drugs are marketed, which is not always the population on which the
drug was originally tested. For the countries that host the clinical
trials, their health systems may receive valuable infusions of capital
by pharmaceutical companies who are anxious to carry out trials
using local populations and researchers. The new drug and its posttrial availability (or lack thereof) will affect health outcomes for the
test subjects in the host country as well. For these reasons and others,
it is important now to ask what legal or ethical guidelines govern the
conduct of clinical trials abroad and whether they are effective in
regulating unethical or exploitative behavior by researchers.
II. DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OR CODES OF ETHICS
REGARDING HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
There are numerous important international documents that
touch on human subject experimentation, and new instruments seem
84. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 6-7.
85. Id. at xi.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 7. Shah also notes that many of the conditions that led these countries to have
such impoverished and sick populations were the result of the interactions, such as colonialism
and globalization, with Western countries that are now sending their pharmaceutical products
across the world for testing. Id. at 15.
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to appear each year. Not all of them can be mentioned here, nor can
88
any one of them be examined in full detail. Instead, this Note looks
at two of the most influential international codes of ethics and two
others which represent new approaches by those who seek to protect
human subjects from unethical research practices.
A. The Nuremberg Code
The importance of the Nuremberg Code (Code) as a point of
departure for the bioethics and broader human rights movements can
hardly be overstated. The Code is recognized as “an authoritative
statement of the fundamental rights of research subjects in all
89
Further, the Code has influenced the development of
nations.”
subsequent human rights documents that go beyond the scope of
90
human subject experimentation.
Aside from the Code’s significance and continued influence as a
symbolic beginning to the regulation of human subject research, its
content offers several points of comparison that are relevant to an
analysis of subsequent bioethics documents. The Code itself consists
of ten principles, stated in simple and direct terms. The first in order
and importance says simply, “[t]he voluntary consent of the human
91
The paragraph which follows
subject is absolutely essential.”
explains that the consent must be given by a person “so situated as to
be able to exercise free power of choice,” free from “any element” of
coercion and based on prior information given to the subject about
92
the nature of the experiment, its purposes, and the risks involved.
The principle of informed consent is the Code’s “most important

88. See generally Sev S. Fluss, The Evolution of Research Ethics: The Current International
Configuration, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 596 (2004) (containing a more extensive list of ethical
guidance instruments).
89. Nicholas A. Christakis & Robert J. Levine, Multinational Research, in 3 ENCYC. OF
BIOETHICS 1780, 1780 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995).
90. The Nuremberg Code provisions have found expression in prohibitions on the use of
wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians of an occupied state in non-therapeutic
experimentation as part of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I (art. 12), II (art. 12), III (art. 13), and
IV (art. 32). Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in THE
NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 149, 153-54. The Code also
influenced the wording of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states,
“In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171. The use of the language of “free consent” is consistent with the language of
the Code. Perley, supra, at 153.
91. Nuremberg Code, princ. I (1947), reprinted in 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1448, 1448 (1996).
92. Id.
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contribution” and has enjoyed wide acceptance in the research
93
None of the other nine provisions of the Code
community.
derogates from the researcher’s “personal duty” to procure and
protect the subject’s informed consent. The rigidity of the Code’s
requirements, and therefore the limits which it placed on research, is
one reason why the medical research community has tried to
“improve” upon it in other instruments.94
In addition, the Code demands that research be performed “as to
yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other
methods or means of study . . . .”95 In spite of the recognition that
research ought to produce some benefit, the Code mentions nothing
about the distribution of that benefit. Moreover, the Code is entirely
devoted to experiments performed on healthy patients.
No
alternatives are mentioned for research combined with treatment, or
therapeutic research.
Though the Code is a legal document, produced as part of an
international criminal trial, it has no legal force.96 A related criticisms
of the Code is that the duty to follow its precepts is placed entirely on
the researcher, who presumably is interested in the success of the
experiment.97 Even as a document written by judges, it is to be
entirely self-enforced. The Code establishes no outside compliance
review or method of sanctioning non-compliance. Of this particular
limitation, perhaps we should be more forgiving. Though the
Nuremberg judges intended to set forth ethical guidelines of enduring
significance, it is important to remember that the Code was written in
response to a discrete set of historical events, namely the Holocaust
and the crimes of the Nazi doctors. The judges were responding to
the specific crimes and evidence before them. The Nuremberg Code
as a whole is a limited and simple document. Future instruments
have added detail and complexity to the principles announced first at
Nuremberg.

93. Perley, supra note 90, at 155.
94. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Declaration of Helsinki), Part II.C (discussing the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine), Part II.D (discussing the
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights).
95. Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. II.
96. See Perley, supra 90, at 160.
97. See Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princs. I, X (assigning to the researcher both the
responsibility of obtaining informed consent and of determining when the experiment should be
terminated).
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The Code’s lack of legal force can be observed in the way it has
interacted with the U.S. legal system. On the legislative and
administrative side, federal regulations depart from the spirit of the
Code by introducing the responsibility of the research institution and
the authority of institutional review boards (IRBs) in lieu of the
Code’s emphasis on the researcher’s authority.98 In U.S. courts, no
injured subject has ever been awarded damages, and no researcher
has ever been punished based purely on violations of the Nuremberg
Code.99 The Code has been mentioned far more often as an
authoritative source in dissent.100 Perhaps the apex of the Code’s use
in U.S. courts was its extensive citation in the dissenting opinions in
United States v. Stanley, which involved the CIA’s MKULTRA
experiments.101 The 5-4 majority denied Mr. Stanley, a soldier in the
U.S. Army, any compensation for his injuries, but Justice Brennan
(joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens) and Justice O’Connor
would have used the standards of the Nuremberg Code to provide
102
him with a right to damages.
B. The Declaration of Helsinki
Because of the Nuremberg Code’s limitations and perceived
flaws, medical researchers soon acted to create their own set of
ethical standards. In 1964, the World Medical Association (WMA)
issued the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration), which soon became
103
the definitive statement of medical ethics regarding research. The

98. Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and
Regulations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 183, 187-88.
The Nuremberg Code also has had great influence on the ethical guidelines promulgated by the
National Institutes of Health. Id. at 186. However, this is of little concern to pharmaceutical
companies, whose principal concern is FDA approval.
99. Annas, supra note 31, at 201.
100. Id. (also noting the irony that the Code has such little legal force even in the United
States, the country whose citizens, judges, and procedures produced the Code in the first place).
In one lower court case, the Nuremberg Code was cited as setting the standard of the required
disclosure of risks by the researcher to the subject. Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F.Supp. 1463,
1470-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
101. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671-72 (1987).
102. Id. at 687, 690-91, 710.
103. See PLOMER, supra note 56, at 2. The World Medical Association was organized in
1947 as a representative body for physicians. Id. The WMA is comprised of national physician
groups such as the American Medical Association (AMA) in the United States. World Medical
Ass’n – List of Members, http://www.wma.net/e/members/list.htm (follow “United States”
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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Declaration has been revised five times since 1964 and has had two
104
notes of clarification added.
As originally formulated, the Declaration placed less emphasis
on informed consent than the Nuremberg Code. From Nuremberg’s
105
characterization of voluntary consent as “absolutely essential,” the
original Declaration reads, “If at all possible, consistent with patient
psychology, the doctor should obtain the patient’s freely given
consent after the patient has been given a full explanation.”106 The
Declaration also allows consent to be given by a proxy of the subject,
in the case of legal or physical incapacity, something which the
Nuremberg Code would not allow.107 In later versions of the
Declaration, the sections on informed consent were strengthened,
calling for “freely-given informed consent” either written or
“formally documented and witnessed.”108
One of the Declaration’s most significant contributions to the
field of medical research ethics is the introduction of independent
109
According to the
committee review of research protocols.
Declaration, the independent committee, known in U.S. regulations
as an institutional review board (IRB), “should be in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the country in which the research
110
The use of foreign IRBs and the
experiment is performed.”
problems associated with them will be addressed in Part IV.
As has been noted by ethicists, the Declaration of Helsinki is
111
In
more permissive and paternalistic than the Nuremberg Code.

104. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 3; World Med. Ass’n [WMA], Declaration of Helsinki,
WMA Policy (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf [hereinafter
Declaration of Helsinki]. The revisions occurred in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000 with the
notes of clarification added in 2002 and 2004. Declaration of Helsinki, supra.
105. Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. I.
106. WMA, Declaration of Helsinki, para. II(1) (June 1964), reprinted in 91 Can. Med.
Ass’n J. 619, 619 (1964) (emphasis added), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
picrender.fcgi?tool=pmcentrez&artid=1927433&blobtype=pdf. The Declaration also places the
provision on informed consent much later than the Nuremberg Code. See id.
107. Id. para. II(1).
108. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 22. Though the provision on informed
consent is moved into the section entitled, “Basic Principles for all Medical Research,” it still
appears in the latter half of the document. See id. The newest version of the Declaration still
provides for proxy consent, but greater protections of vulnerable or incapacitated persons are
provided in those sections. Id. paras. 24-26.
109. R.V. Carlson et al., The revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: Past, Present, and
Future, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 695, 697 (2004).
110. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 13.
111. Annas, supra note 35, at 315.
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part, this reflects the instruments’ different backgrounds. The
Nuremberg Code is primarily concerned with human rights, having
112
been drafted by judges in one of the first human rights tribunals.
The Declaration, on the other hand, was created by doctors for
113
doctors. The increased flexibility was intentional on the part of its
drafters who represented the physicians’ interests and who felt that
the Nuremberg Code was too rigid and legalistic.114
The Declaration was signed by the United States in 1975115 and
was incorporated by the FDA into their regulations for overseas
116
In spite of having been adopted
clinical research that same year.
into FDA regulations, the Declaration is a general statement of
ethics, not a collection of legally binding principles.117 Neither the
WMA, nor the Declaration itself, have established procedures for
enforcement or penalties for violators.118 Moreover, the United States
has refused to sign on to the latest revision of the Declaration,
because of the WMA’s insistence that research subjects should have
access to the best current treatment rather than the best treatment
which would otherwise be available to them.119 This change would
have made it more difficult or impossible to perform placebo trials
with new drugs if an existing remedy for the same problem already
existed.120
Where plaintiffs have brought claims against pharmaceutical
companies for violations of the Declaration, the results have not been
encouraging. For example in Abdullahi v. Pfizer Nigerian nationals
sued Pfizer, an American pharmaceutical company, under the Alien
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).121 Their claim was
based on a drug trial of a new antibiotic, Trovan, which resulted in
112. See supra Part II.A.
113. Annas, supra note 35, at 315; Perley, supra note 90, at 157.
114. See Annas, supra note 35, at 315 (suggesting that the Declaration of Helsinki is
different from the Nuremberg Code in two relevant ways, namely that the Declaration gives
recommendations and that it is more lenient).
115. SHAH, supra note 67, at 75.
116. Id. at 133. Each time that the Declaration was updated between 1975 and 1996, the
regulations were also updated to mirror those changes. Id.
117. See Perley, supra note 90, at 160 (“Although they are highly influential, neither the
Nuremberg Code nor the Declaration of Helsinki has any legally binding authority.”).
118. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 7.
119. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 132-35.
120. See id.
121. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17,
2002), vacated, 77 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating the district court’s order to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens and remanding).
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the death or serious injury of at least eleven children.122 Under the
ATCA, plaintiffs must allege violations of the “law of nations” which
is comprised of norms which are “specific, universal, and
obligatory.”123 The court allowed the Declaration, as well as the
Nuremberg Code and other instruments, to be introduced as evidence
of principles of customary international law, but eventually found that
they were not sufficiently universal to establish a claim under the
124
ATCA.
In addition to the basic principles announced in the Declaration,
another international group, the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in collaboration with
the World Health Organization (WHO), has published its
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research involving
125
The CIOMS Guidelines give more detailed and
Human Subjects.
specific practical guidance concerning the principles found in the
Declaration. For example, Guideline 5 sets forth a list of twenty-six
items of information that a research subject must be provided before
their subsequent consent can be considered informed.126 The frequent
approving references to the Declaration throughout the Guidelines is
evidence that CIOMS believes that the Declaration’s principles are
the proper ones.127
C. Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine
Next, we turn to a recent European approach to the regulation of
clinical trials—the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights

122. Id. at *1-2.
123. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001).
124. See Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4-6. Civil and criminal lawsuits related to the
Trovan study and brought by Nigerian government officials continue in Nigerian courts. See
Jacob Goldstein, Nigerian Judge Orders Arrest of Pfizer Officials, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG,
Dec. 26, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/12/26/nigerian-judge-orders-arrest-of-pfizerofficials; Joe Stephens, Pfizer Faces Criminal Charges in Nigeria, WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, at
A10; Joe Stephens, Panel Faults Pfizer in ‘96 Clinical Trial in Nigeria, WASH. POST, May 7, 2006,
at A01.
125. COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002) [hereinafter CIOMS
GUIDELINES].
126. Id. Guideline 5.
127. See, e.g., id. Guideline 13 (Commentary) (noting that the Guideline is “compatible”
with the Declaration of Helsinki).

04__LAUGHTON.DOC

198

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2008 1:29:05 PM

[Vol 18:181

and Biomedicine (CHRB).128 The most obvious distinction between
the CHRB and the other instruments above is that the CHRB is
applicable only in Europe and only to those nations that are members
of the Council of Europe.129 Currently, the CHRB has been signed by
thirty-four of the Counsel of Europe member nations, but only
twenty-one of the signing members, excluding important European
powers such as France and Italy, have ratified it.130 In addition,
Germany, Russian and the United Kingdom are among the nations
131
that have not signed the CHRB.
The CHRB is a general human rights instrument concerning not
only biomedical research, but also privacy, human genome rights, and
132
The most relevant
the transplantation and trafficking of organs.
sections for the purposes of this note are Chapter V on scientific
research133 and the Additional Protocol on biomedical research, added
in January 2005.134 The Chapter V provisions are short and are
primarily directed to problems of obtaining consent in the context of
135
research.
The most useful details of the CHRB are added by the
Additional Protocol. The Additional Protocol provides for scientific
136
Committee
and ethical review by independent committees.
examination is required in “each State in which any research activity
137
Depending on the scope of the term “research
is to take place.”
activity,” which remains undefined in both the CHRB and the
128. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, Europ. T.S. No. 164 [hereinafter CHRB].
129. The Council of Europe is often confused with the European Union, but the two are
distinct. The Council of Europe is composed of forty-six nations, more than the EU and
including important countries not part of the EU such as Russia, Switzerland, and the former
Yugoslav republics.
Compare The Council of Europe’s Member States,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) with
Member States of the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm (last visited
Jan. 17, 2008).
130. See Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=&DF=
&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
131. See id.
132. CHRB, supra note 128, chs. III, IV, VI.
133. Id. ch. V.
134. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning
Biomedical Research, Jan. 25, 2005, Europ. T.S. No. 195 [hereinafter Additional Protocol].
135. CHRB, supra note 128, ch. V.
136. Additional Protocol, supra note 134, arts. 7, 9-12.
137. Id. art. 9(1).
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Additional Protocol (as well as their respective Explanatory
138
Reports), this may include review in the country of origin. Another
important provision added by the Additional Protocol says that
research carried out by “[s]ponsors or researchers within the
jurisdiction of a Party to this Protocol” that takes place “in a State not
party to this Protocol” must comply with the standards of the
Protocol if they differ from those in that non-party State.139 The
drafters of the Additional Protocol were aware of the growing
number of research projects being carried out abroad and the
possibility of having different standards in different nations.140 Thus,
these more stringent protections are of little value if ethics committee
approval in the home country is not required or is weak and
ineffective.
A separate section, Chapter II, of the CHRB is devoted entirely
to consent, but not solely in the research context.141 Because of its
placement separate from the chapter devoted to research ethics, one
can deduce that consent is an important and overarching concern for
the drafters. An Explanatory Report promulgated with the CHRB
makes clear that this formulation of informed consent is meant to
restrain physician paternalism142 and that the information given to the
patient must be transmitted in a way that is tailored to the specific
person to whom it is communicated such that they can understand the
information and weigh the costs and benefits of the procedure.143 In
the research context, consent must be “express[], specific[], and . . .
144
Research on persons unable to give consent for
documented.”
themselves is severely restricted.145 For example, it may not be done if
“research of comparative effectiveness” could be “carried out on
146
individuals capable of giving consent” instead. Research is further
138. See Explanatory Report, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research, Jan. 25, 2005, Europ. T.S. No. 195, para. 38
(explaining that this would include ethics review in a State where participants are recruited even
if the research is physically carried out in another place) [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
139. Additional Protocol, supra note 134, art. 29 (apparently allowing higher standards in a
host country to take precedence over the Protocol, but the Protocol must set the floor).
140. See Explanatory Report, supra note 138, para. 137.
141. CHRB, supra note 128, ch. II.
142. Explanatory Report, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997,
Europ. T.S. No. 164, para. 34 [hereinafter Explanatory Report #2].
143. Id. para. 36.
144. CHRB, supra note 132, art. 16(v).
145. Id. art. 6(2)-(4) (explaining that as in the Declaration of Helsinki, proxy consent may be
given by an authorized legal representative of the patient).
146. Id. art. 17(1)(iii).
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restricted to instances in which the protocol will produce a direct
benefit to the patient, and if not, the research must have the purpose
of furthering research that will ultimately produce a benefit to that
patient or similarly afflicted individuals and present “minimal risk
147
and minimal burden.”
The usefulness of the CHRB as a device to regulate unethical
research is substantially weakened by the lack of an individual’s right
to petition the European Court of Human Rights under the CHRB
148
provisions. The court is authorized to give only an advisory opinion
149
Any enforcement of CHRB rights is
on interpreting the CHRB.
left to the individual states’ courts.150 However, the rights contained
in the CHRB can be asserted in the European Court of Human
Rights if, instead of bringing an action directly under the CHRB,
plaintiffs find a CHRB right that fits under one of the protections of
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), over which
that court does have jurisdiction.151 The Explanatory Report to the
Convention expressly recognizes the possibility that principles of the
CHRB can be introduced as evidence of the scope of protection
offered by the ECHR.152
D. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights
Of the instruments concerned with international regulation of
biomedical research the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and
Human Rights (Universal Declaration) is undoubtedly the “new kid
on the block.” The Universal Declaration can be looked at as a
culmination of some lessons learned from the past failures of other
international bioethics instruments. However, how much of an
improvement it makes over other instruments remains to be seen. In
June 2003, the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) submitted their Report of the IBC on the Possibility of

147. Id. art. 17(2).
148. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 18.
149. CHRB, supra note 128, art. 29.
150. Id. art. 23.
151. See PLOMER, supra note 56, at 18.
152. Explanatory Report #2, supra note 142, para. 165 (“[F]acts which are an infringement
of the rights contained in this Convention may be considered in proceedings under the
European Convention on Human Rights, if they also constitute a violation of one of the rights
contained in the latter Convention.”).
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Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics.153 With the blessing
of the Director-General of UNESCO and its General Conference, the
IBC then undertook a series of consultations with member states,
drafts, and intergovernmental meetings to discuss the form and
154
Two
content of what would become the Universal Declaration.
years later, on October 19, 2005, the 33rd session of the UNESCO
General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration.155
As to the content of the Universal Declaration, one of the most
striking differences between it and other bioethics instruments is that
the Universal Declaration is “addressed to States.”156 In contrast with
the Nuremberg Code or the Declaration of Helsinki, which are aimed
at researchers or research institutions, the Universal Declaration aims
157
to push change on a governmental level.
The provisions for
informed consent are similar to those found in the documents
discussed above, including a requirement for “prior, free, express, and
informed consent of the person concerned” for research-oriented
treatments.158 For therapeutic, preventative, or diagnostic treatments,
express consent is only recommended “where appropriate.”159 This
kind of looser consent requirement could be exploited as research
and therapeutic interventions converge. In language similar to that of
the CHRB, Article 7 provides “special protection” for persons who
160
lack capacity to consent. Further, recognizing the special problems
of vulnerable groups, perhaps especially the populations of
developing countries, the Universal Declaration refuses to allow the
consent of a community leader or authority or community consent to
supplant the necessity for individual informed consent.161

153. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, http://portal.unesco.org/
shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1883&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited
Jan. 19, 2007).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. U.N. Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO] General Conference, Oct. 19, 2005,
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, art. 1(2), UNESCO SHS/EST/BIO/06/1
[hereinafter Universal Declaration].
157. See id. art. 2(b) (stating that the instrument’s aim is “to guide the actions of individuals,
groups, communities, institutions and corporations, public and private” whereas the CHRB was
only directed to states of Europe).
158. Id. art. 6(2).
159. Id. art. 6(1).
160. Id. art. 7.
161. Id. art. 6(3). However, if researchers feel it is appropriate, they may seek the collective
or community consent. Id.
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The provision for ethics committees (Article 19) initially says
that the committees “should be established, promoted and supported
162
at the appropriate level.” Within that provision, it is not made clear
what the “appropriate level” is.
Rather, in Article 21 on
“Transnational Practices”, the Universal Declaration provides that
research being performed in a country other than the one where the
funding source is located should be subject to dual ethical review.163
Furthermore, the Universal Declaration insists that the terms of
research agreements be established by negotiation characterized by
“equal participation” by the parties.164 Both of these sections seem to
be aimed directly at two of the most serious problems with
international clinical trials— the lack of ethical review in the host
country and heavy-handedness and exploitation by the large
pharmaceutical companies, many of which may have greater
resources than the governments of the countries where their human
subject research is performed.
As noted earlier, the Universal Declaration is addressed to
states, and its drafters have seemingly left the enforcement and
administration of its provisions to the state-parties. Article 22 says
that “[s]tates should take all appropriate measures, whether of a
legislative, administrative or other character, to give effect to the
principles . . .” of the Universal Declaration.165 There is no reference
to any international judicial or regulatory body in any part of the
Universal Declaration. Instead, the drafters seem hopeful that the
benefits of “education, training and public information,” as well as
international cooperation, will be sufficient protection against
inappropriate and unethical research.166
III. ETHICAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING HUMAN
RESEARCH IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
This note now turns to specific ethical problems that characterize
overseas clinical trials. As in Part II above, every ethical dilemma
associated with such research cannot be fully addressed here.
Instead, this Note looks at four issues that are, arguably, the most
important and in most need to be addressed by regulation and policy.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. art. 19 (emphasis added).
Id. art. 21(2).
Id. art. 21(4).
Id. art. 22(1).
See id. arts. 22-24.
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A. Distribution of the Costs and Benefits of International Clinical
Research
The question of who benefits and who carries the burden of
international clinical trials is crucial. Clearly, the pharmaceutical
companies and CROs that carry out the research at lower cost, under
less scrutiny and with a more abundant population of subjects are
167
beneficiaries. The populations of developed countries also benefit
from new drugs that are developed primarily for their consumption
without the need to subject themselves to the risks of clinical testing.
The burdens of such research, however, fall disproportionately on the
populations of the developing countries where more and more clinical
trials are carried out.
There are concerns that pharmaceutical companies test drugs
that are unresponsive to the needs of the local populations in the
168
Bioethics
developing countries where the tests are conducted.
documents have consistently recognized the need for the benefits of
169
research to outweigh costs or burdens as to individual subjects. A
more recent concern has been whether subject populations are
receiving adequate consideration before, during, and after the trials.
The most recent revision of the Declaration of Helsinki says that
research is “only justified if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
populations in which the research is carried out stand to benefit from
the results.”170 One method of providing some benefit to subject
populations is through post-trial access to the tested products or other
proven treatments. One of two new paragraphs in the Declaration of
Helsinki concerns post-trial access to the best proven methods of
treatment.171 Because of the burdens it allegedly places on the
researchers and their sponsors, this addition has been one of the most
172
contentious revisions of the Declaration in recent times.
The Universal Declaration also shows concern throughout for
the needs of developing countries, stating that “[t]ransnational health

167. Carel Ijsselmuiden & Ruth Faden, Research and Informed Consent in Africa, in
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 363, 369 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999).
168. Jack Killen et al., Ethics of Clinical Research in the Developing World, in 2 NATURE
REVS. IMMUNOLOGY 210, 214 (2002).
169. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, paras. 5, 16-18; Universal Declaration, supra
note 156, arts. 3(2), 4.
170. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 19.
171. Id. para. 30. A note of clarification was added to paragraph 30 in 2004, reaffirming the
WMA’s position on the necessity of post-trial access. Id. para. 30 n.2.
172. Carlson, supra note 109, at 702.
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research should be responsive to the needs of host countries.”173
Article 15 is explicit in declaring that the benefits of research “should
be shared with . . . the international community, in particular with
developing countries.”174 Article 15 goes on to enumerate various
forms that such benefits might take, such as provision of new
products, “capacity-building facilities,” and increased access to health
care.175
Debate on these issues centers on whether the benefits of the
trial alone provide sufficient benefit to the local population if no
access to treatment was available to that population prior to the tests,
and whether any harm is caused if, once the trial is over, the situation
is returned to the status quo ante.176 Research institutions and health
care systems in developing countries can indeed receive some muchneeded investment and improvements through hosting clinical trials.
Those benefits can then be passed down to the local patients that they
serve. Nevertheless, as it relates to post-trial access to the treatment
itself, it seems cruel to introduce a higher standard of care to a sick
population, which hopefully produces a higher standard of living, and
to then abandon treatment once enough positive results begin to
manifest themselves.
It should be emphasized that the question of post-trial access is
separate from the related and equally important question of whether
the distribution of costs and benefits between the developing world,
serving largely as “guinea pigs,” and the developed world, which is
the primary consumer of new drugs, is a just one. In the author’s
opinion, there is something pernicious about this divorcing of costs
and benefits. From a historical perspective, it is reminiscent of a
relationship between the developed and the developing world that
was characteristic of colonialism in previous years and in the current
era by the problems of inferior labor and environmental standards
and human exploitation. Post-trial access is an important goal that
ought to be pursued, despite predictable opposition by the
pharmaceutical companies. As recommended by the Declaration of
Helsinki, any provision for post-trial access should be made part of
the ethical review process that precedes the execution of any trial.177
Nevertheless, the provision of additional benefits derived from
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 21(3).
Id. art. 15.
Id.
Carlson, supra note 109, at 702.
Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 30 n.2.
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participation in clinical trials, such as investments in infrastructure
and capacity-building, should continue to be mandated by
international guidelines, and such requirements should be introduced
into domestic law.178
B. Ethical Imperialism or Cultural Relativism?
One of the most enduring and overarching debates regarding
international clinical trials is the struggle between the search for
universal principles and the need to respect diversity and pluralism.
In this debate, it is important to remember that both sides are
concerned about the exploitation of persons in developing
179
countries. The universalists are concerned that researchers will take
advantage of lower standards in developing countries to perform
studies that would be unethical and impermissible in developed
nations.180 The pluralists or relativists are worried that imposing the
developed world’s norms and practices on the developing world is
181
There are two principal questions in this
similarly exploitative.
debate. The first question is whether the same definitions and values
apply to concepts such as informed consent in different cultures and
different populations. This area will be discussed specifically in the
context of informed consent in Part III.C below.
The second question is whether the same standard of care should
apply across cultures, especially in light of the different levels of
prosperity and health care access enjoyed by those in the developed
and developing worlds. The argument revolves around whether
developing country research subjects are entitled to the “best current
treatment,” the standard which emerges from the Declaration of
Helsinki, even if the best current treatment would not normally be
182
This standard would, with few
available to that population.
exceptions, effectively eliminate the use of a placebo control group

178. At least one group of authors has recognized the superiority of this broader definition
of benefits as opposed to one focused solely on post-trial access to treatment. See Conference
on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, Moral Standards for Research in
Developing Countries: From “Reasonable Availability” to “Fair Benefits,” 34 HASTINGS CTR.
REP., 17, 22-24 (2004).
179. Christakis & Levine, supra note 89, at 1781-82.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1782.
182. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 29. A version of this standard was
added in the 1996 revision, but the outrage surrounding it emerged after the 2000 revision.
Carlson, supra note 109, at 700.
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where an existing treatment already exists.183 The question then
essentially becomes whether the prescribed minimum is the best
current treatment available anywhere, or the best current treatment
available in the area where the research is taking place.184
Both viewpoints in this debate have their costs and benefits. If
one insists that a universal standard of care should be imposed, this
substantially raises the cost of the research and eliminates the costsaving incentive to perform research abroad. If that position is
combined with a commitment to post-trial access to treatment, the
cost may become prohibitive. We should not forget that the benefits
of clinical trials to developing countries, such as those enumerated in
Part III.A, would be withdrawn if such research became impossible.
Using a current treatment, rather than a placebo, in a control group
also makes discerning the scientific results more difficult; this explains
one of the exceptions in the Declaration of Helsinki.185
Observing a universal standard of care would certainly
contribute to equality and nondiscrimination, two laudable ethical
goals. However, it may not be best for the long-term health of
developing countries. A contextualized standard of care, probably
lower in developing countries, makes it more likely that research will
be carried out in developing countries, with its attendant benefits in
training and investment. These material and educational benefits
could be a more efficient contribution to future health outcomes than
a universal standard of care during research, especially if post-trial
access is not a viable option.
While the Universal Declaration does not directly address the
placebo-“best current treatment” debate, philosophically it is
unabashed in its commitment to the search for “universal
principles.”186 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration makes clear
that “cultural diversity and pluralism” should not be used to “infringe
upon human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, nor

183. Carlson, supra note 109, at 700. A “note of clarification” added to the Declaration in
2002 regarding the placebo standard added two circumstances in which placebos could be used
even if a proven treatment exists: (1) for “compelling and scientifically sound . . . reasons” and
(2) where the condition is minor and the control group will not be exposed to “any additional
risk of serious or irreversible harm.” Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 29 n.1. The
CHRB Additional Protocol contains a similar but narrower exception, permitting placebo use in
some situations. Additional Protocol, supra note 134, art. 23(3).
184. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO
HEALTHCARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 89 (2002).
185. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 29 n.1.
186. See Universal Declaration, supra note 156, pmbl, art. 2(a).
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upon the principles [of] this Declaration, nor to limit their scope.”187
However, there is no infringement of human rights where people
continue to be provided with a standard of care no less than what
they had been receiving, while working to provide greater long-term
benefits in the form of improved local health care systems or
development of new treatments that will be made available to
subjects in the future. That being said, there is never an ethical or
legal excuse to go below the local or national standard of care for
treating a certain disease or condition in order to prove the
effectiveness of a treatment that may not immediately be made
188
available to the subject population.
C. Informed Consent
Informed consent has justifiably been described as the “hard
189
inner core” of medical research ethics. As mentioned above, in the
Nuremberg Code, informed consent is the first of the essential
190
principles of bioethics. Among the international ethical guidelines
examined here, and in other ethical guidelines, there is no dispute
about the necessity of informed consent in clinical trials.191 These
instruments are also largely in agreement about the form and
requirements of informed consent, even if there are differences as to
some details.
For example, most recognize that additional
protections are necessary for those who cannot give informed consent
for themselves,192 and most recognize the right to withdraw consent at
any time during the research.193
Because of the acknowledged and agreed-upon centrality of
informed consent as a protection for research subjects, it is vital that
informed consent is carried into practice in an effective manner
wherever research occurs. Unfortunately, some data indicates that
informed consent is not fully implemented in trials in the developing
world. One question is whether the consent is truly informed, or
187. Id. art. 12.
188. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 184, at 95.
189. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 147.
190. Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. 1; see SHAH, supra note 67, at 147.
191. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, arts. 6-7; Declaration of Helsinki, supra note
104, paras. 20, 22; CHRB, supra note 128, arts. 5-6, 16-17; Nuremberg Code, supra note 91,
princ. 1.
192. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 7; Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104,
paras. 24-26; CHRB, supra note 132, arts. 6, 17.
193. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 6(1); Declaration of Helsinki, supra note
104, para. 22; CHRB, supra note 128, art. 5; Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. 9.
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whether it ever can be in developing countries. In one survey, only
sixteen percent of researchers claimed that they verified that a subject
194
Some researchers have expressed
understood the procedure.
concerns that informing subjects in the developing world is futile due
195
to linguistic or cultural barriers and low levels of education.
Another question is whether consent can be free in developing
countries. There is anecdotal evidence that in many instances,
subjects feel coerced into participating or are not told that they may
196
withdraw at any time. Part of this coercion can be due to financial
197
or other incentives to stay in the trial or because subjects simply do
198
not feel free to say no. Such unwillingness to refuse can originate in
notions of the authority of Western doctors, the fallacy that a
treatment will improve their health, lack of education, or structural
issues in the culture or society.199 In fact, a survey in 2001 found that
among researchers working in developing countries, “[forty-five]
percent reported that their low-literacy subjects never refused to
participate.”200
The necessity of individual informed consent is another locus
where the debate between universalism and relativism is played out.
On one side are the drafters of the numerous ethical guidance
instruments, who have acknowledged the necessity of informed
consent. On the other side, some researchers and CROs promote the
idea that certain populations in the developing world are, because of
culture, more docile and malleable than Americans and therefore
201
better candidates for research. Others, including foreign physicians,
believe that informed consent is a Western principle and is
202
It is true that in
“unnecessary” in the context of other cultures.
some cultures personhood is defined differently than in Western
cultures, and therefore the consent of the individual will not be as

194. SHAH, supra note 67, at 147. Another study found that eighty percent of Haitian
participants in a trial could not explain the basics of the procedure immediately after it had been
explained to them. Id. at 148.
195. Id. at 151.
196. Id. at 148.
197. Id. at 149 (giving examples of powerful incentives, such as money in poor countries or
food where there is an ongoing famine).
198. See id. at 148-49.
199. See Christakis & Levine, supra note 89, at 1784.
200. SHAH, supra note 67, at 148.
201. Id. at 149 (noting a CRO executive’s opinion that “the Chinese are not that fully
emancipated as in the U.S.” and are “more willing to be guinea pigs”).
202. Id. at 151.
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important as that of the family or the community.203 Such dilemmas
have also raised concerns that the overzealous pursuit of individual
consent in a collectivist society could lead to the “weaken[ing of] the
social fabric.”204 Nevertheless, the Universal Declaration rejected any
attempt to circumvent individual consent or to use diversity as a
pretext to “infringe upon . . . human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”205 This leads to a larger discussion about the universality
of “human rights” that is beyond the scope of this essay.
For those who are strongly committed to the necessity of
individual informed and free consent, the most obvious course of
action would be to shut down trials in the developing world where
such ideals could not be put into practice. This seems too extreme a
remedy, especially in light of the benefits that individuals and
societies in the developing world can derive from participation in
clinical trials and the practical necessity of their involvement for the
development of new drugs. However, any deviation from the
standard of individual informed and free consent should be closely
scrutinized by ethical review committees. Those committees should
be well-trained and should receive the relevant evidence from
researchers, anthropologists, and others to decide whether such a
departure is truly necessary.
D. Deficiencies in Ethical Review
As seen in Part II, one of the ways in which international codes
of ethics and current FDA regulations differ is in the requirements
for ethical review. Both the Declaration of Helsinki (which the FDA
has incorporated into its regulations) and the Convention on Human
Rights and Biomedicine provide for ethical review only by the
206
The
country where the research takes place (the host country).
Universal Declaration, on the other hand, establishes a requirement
207
of approval by at least two review committees, one in the host
country and the other in the country where the source of research
funding is located.208

203. Christakis & Levine, supra note 89, at 1783.
204. Id. at 1784.
205. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 12.
206. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 13; Additional Protocol, supra note 134,
art. 9.
207. In the context of the United States, ethical review committees go by the name of
institutional review boards or IRBs. See supra Parts II.B.
208. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 21(2).
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The idea that host countries should be the primary locus of
ethical review has much to recommend it. It is not unreasonable to
assume that local IRBs will be more protective of their countrymen
than will a group of foreigners. Researchers as well as IRB members
are often anxious to avoid allegations of “ethical imperialism” and
ethnocentricity, terms that are often tossed around in the debates
surrounding overseas clinical trials.209 Allowing the host country IRBs
to handle ethical review by setting and applying their own standards
is a convenient way to avoid such charges. However, the implicit
assumption of such a stance is that IRBs in host countries are as
capable as those in the developed sponsor countries at protecting the
interests and health of research subjects, or at least at protecting them
to the degree that their culture requires. There is significant evidence
to the contrary.
As mentioned above, a recent survey conducted by the National
Bioethics Advisory Committee found that one-fourth of all overseas
210
That same
clinical trials went through no ethical review at all.
inquiry found that several nations did not have ethical review
211
committees and had no plans to create them. Even in those nations
with committees, the review was largely ineffective, and there are
several barriers that prevent ethical review from taking place in many
countries. One significant problem is a lack of capacity. For
example, doctors may lack training in medical ethics and good
research practices.212 In some countries, like India, one of the current
hot spots for medical research, the domestic medical association
213
resists the imposition of minimum standards of ethics and practices.
Another difficult issue is the possibility that foreign IRBs will be
unduly influenced by the resources of the pharmaceutical companies
and the financial incentives being offered to their institution for
participating in the study.214 The danger is that ethics committees will

209. See Ijsselmuiden & Faden, supra note 167, at 364, 369.
210. SHAH, supra note 67, at 136.
211. Id. at 135.
212. Id. at 117–18 (giving India as an example, where one of its foremost ethical experts
pointed out that “[t]here is no ethics culture in the profession” and “nobody is trained in
ethics”).
213. Id. at 114.
214. See GRAHAM DUKES, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
77-78 (2006); see generally Robert Gatter, Conflicts of Interest in International Human Drug
Research and the Insufficiency of International Protections, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 351, 353 (2006)
(discussing generally the conflicts of interest due to the financial incentives offered to host
country governments, researchers and institutions by biomedical firms).
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“rubber stamp” unethical protocols, simply because they want the
215
financial rewards of hosting clinical trials.
How could ethical review be carried out more effectively? One
proposal would be to follow the principles set out in the Universal
Declaration. This would require that the sponsoring country (most
likely an industrialized Western nation with greater review capacity,
resources, and higher standards) carry out its own ethical review and
protect foreign patients to the same degree that they would protect
domestic patients. While this would aid in harmonizing and, in
general, raising standards across countries, forcing equivalent ethical
review by the sponsoring country would eliminate some of the
advantages that have created so much interest and activity in the area
of foreign clinical trials. An alternative or additional proposal would
be to have those governments, institutions, and businesses that carry
out or sponsor foreign trials contribute to the development and
capacity-building for ethical review in the countries where such
studies are carried out. Their assistance should be both financial and
technical. The objective would be to create IRBs where none
currently exist and to train and monitor the committees where IRBs
are already in place but are ineffective in screening out unethical and
exploitative research protocols.
CONCLUSION
This note has focused on how the standards and principles set
forth in international bioethics documents can be applied to the
particular problems affecting international pharmaceutical clinical
trials. The recommendations above are primarily ways in which
governmental bodies, such as the FDA, international groups, such as
the WMA and UNESCO, and private researchers can work towards
the protection of human research subjects. These measures should
not be employed alone, ignoring a wide range of private responses
that could be employed to encourage compliance and higher
standards by violating companies.216 It is not a realistic solution to
absolutely prohibit by law all overseas clinical trials, nor is that
necessarily the most desirable outcome for the populations who will
be the patients in the trial. However, much can be done to offer
215. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 135-36.
216. See generally Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for
Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 67 (2004) (examining private solutions such as private litigation, market pressure,
“shaming”, industry codes of conduct, and accreditation).
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greater protection to international human research subjects and to
make the distribution of benefits from global pharmaceutical research
more equitable.

